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A universal basic income (BI) is an idea that over 
time has fascinated citizens, policymakers, politi-
cians and scientists alike. The idea is radical and 
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The idea of a universal basic income (BI) is both radical and simple. Obtaining a sufficient citizenship-based 
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seemingly simple, but rests upon complex philoso-
phies about society and solidarity, while it has a long 
history in political thought (Widerquist et al., 2013). 
Although a BI has been presented as a simple and 
unified idea, concrete BI policy proposals take many 
different forms, varying in goals, coverage, benefit 
levels, entitlement conditions and implementation 
trajectories (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). In its 
most full-fledged form, a BI has a universal cover-
age (provided to every citizen), its level guarantees 
independent subsistence to each individual, and it is 
unconditionally provided (no obligations are 
attached). Obtaining a sufficient income without 
having to work, without showing the willingness to 
work or demonstrating that one is not (or no longer) 
able to work, is fundamentally opposing the founda-
tions of the common welfare systems that are in 
place nowadays. Clearly, a full-fledged BI is a ‘radi-
cal departure from traditional welfare state policies’ 
(Widerquist et al., 2013).
The idea of a BI has long historical roots (e.g. it is 
discussed in Thomas Paine’s 1796 pamphlet on 
Agrarian Justice), but in the last decade, BI seems to 
have moved beyond a ‘political pipedream’ and has 
now entered political debates as a serious policy pro-
posal (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2017). Experimental trials 
with a variety of BI forms have been debated and 
introduced in Finland, the Netherlands, France, 
Canada and the United States (OECD, 2017). As BI 
has gained increasing attention in public debates and 
among policymakers, questions arise about what the 
general popular support for introducing a BI actually 
is, how it is related to individuals’ social positions 
and ideologies, and to the economic, institutional 
and cultural contexts in which they live.
From the research literature, we do know quite a bit 
about the individual and contextual determinants of 
welfare attitudes generally (Roosma et al., 2013; 
Svallfors, 2012), but understanding support for BI can-
not be simply deduced from this literature. A BI is 
introduced as a radical alternative for the current social 
income provision in European welfare states, but the 
proposal is still not implemented in any of these coun-
tries, resulting in people having no experience with it 
and possibly having limited knowledge about the con-
sequences of its possible implementation (that can take 
various forms). Understanding BI support is therefore 
not self-evident, that is, the usual theoretical explana-
tions for differences in welfare attitudes that focus on 
self-interest and ideological motivations (Meier Jæger, 
2006) are difficult to apply directly to explaining dif-
ferences in BI support. For instance, a BI may not only 
be positively experienced by the most vulnerable, but 
also by those who welcome better opportunities for 
combining work and care; the BI is not an exclusive 
‘leftist’ idea, since liberal right-wingers have pledged 
for a simple and minimal social security system 
(Widerquist et al., 2013) and a BI may have different 
social impacts in different welfare systems. Moreover, 
deservingness theory predicting that benefit schemes 
that are targeted at groups that are considered to be 
more deserving are more popular (Van Oorschot et al., 
2017), has a complex relation to BI support as well; BI 
is aimed at both deserving and undeserving individu-
als. For instance, the scheme will also benefit those 
who are not in need of a benefit (as a BI is universal) 
and those who do not reciprocate (as a BI is uncondi-
tional). In addition, the existing studies that focus on 
explaining BI support from an individual’s characteris-
tics are scarce and mostly lacking analytical depth due 
to data restraints. An important aim of this article is 
therefore to explore and understand the different 
aspects and predictors of BI support. For these rea-
sons, our analyses will have an explorative rather than 
a hypothesis testing character.
We aim to answer the following research ques-
tions: (1) What is the level of support for a BI in 
different European countries? (2) Which groups of 
citizens are more or less in favour of it? (3) What are 
the country characteristics that influence BI support? 
In addition, to get a better understanding of whether 
and how people’s support for BI is embedded in their 
other welfare attitudes (which could give informa-
tion on whether they actually perceive and evaluate 
BI as a radical alternative to the current welfare sys-
tem), we add the question: (4) How is popular sup-
port for a BI associated with other welfare attitudes, 
such as people’s support for welfare provision, and 
their perceptions of the performance and outcomes 
of their welfare state?
As mentioned, ours is not the first study on sup-
port for a BI, but it is the first to analyse cross-
nationally a broad range of explanatory individual 
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and contextual factors that may affect it, which has 
become possible by the recent release of data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS) 2016, which is 
available for 23 European countries. Moreover, this 
is the first study that was able to use a cross-sectional 
survey question that introduces a comprehensive 
idea of BI and its different aspects: its guaranteed 
minimum income, its universal character, its uncon-
ditionality, that it replaces other benefits and services 
and that it is paid for by taxes. Using such a compre-
hensive, yet precise definition with different aspects 
has of course methodological implications that we 
will discuss in our methods section. Yet the clear 
advantage is that the abstract concept is now intro-
duced in detail and refers directly to the most general 
definition of a BI that is used in the public policy 
debates about the proposal. As such, our findings 
may function as a frame of reference for studies that 
use less comprehensive definitions of BI.
In the next section, we first discuss previous find-
ings about public support for a BI, the possible indi-
vidual and contextual determinants for this support 
and the relations with other welfare attitudes. After 
introducing our data and methods, we present the 
results of our analyses and discuss them in the 
‘Discussion and conclusion’ section, paying particu-
lar attention to the issue of how respondents seem to 
have interpreted the ESS BI question.
Public opinion on BI
Previous findings
Studies that asked people about their support for 
various forms of BI are scarce, and scattered over 
countries and time periods. Given the fact that BI 
opinions are a very recent subject of study, we will 
discuss their findings here briefly by way of over-
view of the state of knowledge.
As for levels of support, the existing studies learn 
that larger parts of national populations of European 
countries show support of around 50–80 percent for 
introducing a form of BI (Andersson and Kangas, 
2002; Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Ipsos, 2017; Liebig 
and Mau, 2002; Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont, 
2017; Ullrich, 2002).1 Ullrich (2002) reports that in 
a selection of the OECD countries, averages of 
above 50 percent agree with the general idea that the 
government should provide everyone with ‘a guar-
anteed basic income’. In Sweden, support levels of 
45 percent are found for alternative BI schemes 
(Andersson and Kangas, 2002), while in other 
Nordic countries, support levels for BI schemes tend 
to be higher. Different studies report support in 
Finland ranging between 50 (Stadelmann-Steffen 
and Dermont, 2017) and 63–79 percent for various 
BI schemes (Andersson and Kangas, 2002), while 
support in Norway peaks around 66 percent (Bay 
and Pedersen, 2006). In a sample of employed peo-
ple in Germany, 77 percent of respondents support a 
guaranteed minimum income (Liebig and Mau, 
2002), and in the United Kingdom, 48 percent of the 
population said they would support an uncondi-
tional, universal BI at subsistence level (Ipsos, 
2017). A European Union (EU)-comparative online 
survey study found that on average 68 percent of 
working age Europeans across 28 EU member states 
reported that they would vote for the introduction of 
a BI (Dalia, 2017). So, BI seems to be popular over 
time and across countries. However, under more 
detailed specifications, a BI might drop substan-
tively in popularity. Especially, the suggestion that 
not only natives, but also immigrants would be cov-
ered by a BI lowered support levels (Bay and 
Pedersen, 2006; Linnanvirta et al., 2017; Stadelmann-
Steffen and Dermont, 2017), and reference to the 
possible (cost) consequences of a BI, like increased 
taxes or reduced (other) benefits, had an eroding 
effect in the United Kingdom (Ipsos, 2017).
The question about which considerations moti-
vate people to be in favour or against a BI is an 
important issue for understanding (lack of) public 
support. Of Dutch BI supporters, 79 percent report a 
practical reason, that due to a BI’s administrative 
simplicity there would be fewer opportunities for 
abuse (Van Oorschot, 1998). The main reasons men-
tioned against it were concerned with the work ethic 
and with deservingness considerations (it would also 
be given to people who do not need it and people do 
not have to reciprocate; Van Oorschot, 1998). The 
Ipsos UK study found as most important reasons to 
support a BI that it would offer more income secu-
rity, reward unpaid work, guarantee an income in 
time of unemployment due to technology and 
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automation, and simplify the present system and 
bureaucracy (Ipsos, 2017). Also, this study found 
support for a BI to be lower when the BI was pre-
sented as not being restricted to the needy and work-
ing or work-willing only. The EU-comparative study 
of Dalia (2017) found as most popular reasons in 
favour of a BI that it would reduce anxiety about 
financing basic needs, and create more equality of 
opportunity, while the reasons against include that a 
BI might encourage people to stop working, would 
attract migrants and should not been given to those 
who are not in need of it. Note that the differences in 
(types of) motives found by these studies are related 
to the fact that each asked interviewees to respond to 
a different set of pre-structured alternatives.
Possible individual characteristics 
influencing BI support
With Martinelli (2017), we assume most generally 
that, as in the case of other welfare attitudes 
(Meier Jæger, 2006), BI opinions are affected by 
the interests people have in the provision, and by 
their ideological stances. The two empirical stud-
ies with analyses of individual-level determinants 
align in finding that people with weaker socio-
economic positions and people with a more left-
wing political stance tend to be (somewhat) more 
in favour of a BI (Andersson and Kangas, 2002; 
Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont, 2017). This 
suggests that (perceived) personal need and inse-
curity, as well as a preference for social equality 
affects BI opinions, aligning with the results from 
welfare attitude studies generally (Meier Jæger, 
2006; Roosma et al., 2014). However, Linnanvirta 
et al. (2017) find that among their sample of poor 
Fins, the level of support for a BI, as well as the 
motives for and against it, do not differ substan-
tively from the Finnish general population. Also, 
from a theoretical perspective, it is not immedi-
ately clear what kind of interest indicators and 
ideological positions would play which role.
As for interests, there are suggestions in the lit-
erature that specific groups would benefit rela-
tively most from a BI, and would therefore be 
more supportive of it. BI would advantage espe-
cially people in more economically precarious 
situations, such as workers with more insecure 
working patterns, low-paid and part-time workers 
and people on (means-tested) minimum income 
benefits (Martinelli, 2017). Also, Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght (2017) argue that the ‘precariat’ 
should support a BI most, because in an economic 
sense, it would ‘gain most’ of it (p. 183). As peo-
ple with lower education have a higher risk of 
ending in a more precarious position, it could be 
expected that they would be more in favour of a 
BI. Women, who in general work fewer hours, are 
paid significantly less, and are often dependent on 
a breadwinner, are expected to benefit from a BI 
in both financial and emancipatory terms (Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017).2 We therefore 
include indicators of socio-economic position as 
subjective income level, work status, educational 
level and gender in our explorative analysis.
A fully fledged BI covers the whole (adult) popu-
lation, however, and as such, affects the economic 
situation of all citizens. Thus, it can be argued that 
people in a lower structural position would not 
favour a benefit structure that benefits the rich as 
well. Especially, working-class people supporting 
new right-wing parties might argue that a BI is a 
typical instrument of egalitarians to benefit non-
deserving people (De Koster et al., 2013). In this 
respect, we can also refer to deservingness theory 
that argues that people are less in favour of benefit 
schemes that benefit undeserving social groups 
(Van Oorschot, 2006). Important criteria to judge 
the deservingness of social groups are the neediness 
of the group, whether or not they reciprocate to 
society and whether or not they can be held respon-
sible for their situation of neediness (Van Oorschot 
et al., 2017). As BI is both universal and uncondi-
tional, it will benefit social groups that are not needy 
(‘the rich’) and that do not reciprocate or take 
responsibility (‘the lazy unemployed’). The fact that 
BI also benefits undeserving individuals may alter 
support, also of those who do have a direct eco-
nomic interest in it.
Moreover, there are other than economic inter-
ests to support a BI. Psychological effects, as for 
example, experiencing more freedom in one’s life, 
or social effects, as for example, being able to pay 
more attention to social life, care and personal 
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development, may be valued as well, and not only 
or mostly by the lower classes or by women. It 
could be expected that for this reasoning people 
with children at home, would favour a BI. Age may 
also be a factor in supporting BI, although it is not 
immediately clear in which the direction the effect 
would go. People later in their career may value a 
BI to create the possibility of working fewer hours, 
while people at the start or in the middle of their 
working life could benefit from using free time for 
investing in personal development. We include var-
iables as whether or not people have children at 
home and also age that may be a factor in valuing 
free time and personal development.
As for the influence of ideological stances, 
expectations are not self-evident either, because in 
social debates the BI is advocated on the basis of a 
range of different ideologies. For instance, from an 
egalitarian perspective, BI is advocated as an 
income equalizer and a strong remedy against pov-
erty (Baker, 1992; Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 
1986), and as a socialist critique on capitalism as 
well (Wright, 2010). But, a BI has also been advo-
cated from a liberal perspective in setting all peo-
ple free to make their own decisions in life (Jordan, 
1992). And, both business leaders and liberals have 
been attracted by ‘its simple, non-bureaucratic, 
trap free, market-friendly operation’ (Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght, 2017). Among BI supporters is 
also free market advocate Milton Friedman who 
argues that a BI will ‘free the poor from a cumber-
some, paternalistic welfare system’ (Widerquist 
et al., 2013: 2). From a communitarian perspective, 
the BI is promoted as offering people possibilities 
of opting for caring or participating in other 
socially meaningful ways in society, or contribut-
ing to gender equality, social cohesion and social 
trust (Etzioni and Platt, 2008; Jordan, 1992). 
Political parties as such, however, never carried 
the idea very strongly though, with some excep-
tions that can particularly be found in the green 
parties (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). 
Support for a BI may therefore not be directly 
linked to a specific type of ideological stance or 
may be linked to multiple ideological positions. To 
explore the relationship with ideological variables, 
we include political left–right stance, egalitarianism 
and meritocratic values as individual predictors in 
our analyses.
Possible contextual factors influencing BI 
support
In the literature addressing popular support for a BI, 
it is commonly suggested that such support may be 
influenced by characteristics of the national context 
that people live in, especially by the general institu-
tional design of a country’s welfare state or regime 
type. As BI is presented as a radical alternative to 
the current welfare state, introducing it would 
directly contradict the underlying logic of different 
welfare regimes. A BI clearly challenges the liberal 
welfare regime that is strongly based on means-
tested benefits for the poor only and where benefits 
contain strict job-seeking obligations (Panitch, 
2011). It is also fundamentally different from the 
social insurance-based benefit systems in corporate 
welfare regimes, which rely on wage-related contri-
butions and benefits (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 
2017). And although a BI system seems to be most 
close to the universal Scandinavian type of welfare 
regime, with its broad coverage and encompassing 
benefit levels, it nevertheless conflicts with the 
regime’s historical focus on (full) employment and 
‘activation’ of unemployed people (Bonoli, 2010). 
Bay and Pedersen (2006) suggest in this respect that 
the high work ethic of Scandinavian citizens may be 
a strong cultural barrier for BI support. Therefore, 
welfare regime theory cannot give us clear guidance 
in predicting in which welfare state regimes BI 
would be most supported.
In addition to welfare regime type, the influ-
ence of other contextual factors is hinted upon in 
the literature (Martinelli and De Wispelaere, 2017; 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). Suggestions 
regard socio-economic factors that signal degrees 
of social needs, like unemployment rate, inequal-
ity and poverty. The idea is that there would be 
more support for a BI in countries (and times) 
with higher levels of need for social support. In 
countries with higher levels of unemployment and 
higher levels of material deprivation, people 
would favour a BI more as a means to ensure a 
guaranteed minimum income level for people in 
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need. Higher levels of inequality could increase 
support for a redistributive measure under the 
condition that BI is perceived as such. A similar 
mechanism finds support in welfare attitude stud-
ies, where support for more generous welfare ben-
efits and more redistribution is higher in countries 
where unemployment, poverty and inequality are 
higher (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Jeene 
et al., 2014). Related to this, one could expect that 
in countries where social need is addressed more 
comprehensively, as in countries where social 
spending is higher and even so in countries that 
are wealthier, a BI may be (seen as) less necessary 
to provide in social support and may therefore be 
less popular. This may be related to the fact that 
the so-called path dependency of welfare institu-
tions is stronger in more developed welfare states 
(Boone et al., 2018; Pierson, 2000), with the result 
that it will be more difficult to gather support for a 
radical alternative such as BI.
There are also, however, suggestions of cultural 
factors playing a role. A stronger cultural norm of 
the importance of work ethic would be associated 
with lower support for an unconditional BI (Bay and 
Pedersen, 2006) as a BI gives people the opportu-
nity to refrain from working life. In countries where 
the work ethnic norm is high, there could be more 
resistance to the element of unconditionality in the 
definition of BI. In addition, we look at the influ-
ence of the power of trade unions in national econo-
mies. It is suggested that trade unions hinder the 
introduction of a BI, as they emphasize the impor-
tance of paid work (Vanderborght, 2006). In coun-
tries where trade union density is high, rejection of 
the BI proposal could be stronger, as public debates 
are more influenced by the resistance of trade 
unions. We also include trade union membership at 
the individual level.
There are very limited cross-national studies in 
which the effects of contextual factors as we dis-
cussed here are actually analysed and tested. By our 
knowledge, there is one research note that examines 
correlations between contextual characteristics and 
the mean BI support in countries (Lee, 2018). 
However, this study does not take into account the 
individual-level variation and composition effects. 
Therefore, also with regard to context factors, we 
adopt an exploratory approach. In our analysis of 
country differences in BI opinions, we will include 
the following factors mentioned above in a multi-
level analysis: unemployment rate, material depriva-
tion rate (poverty measure), income inequality, 
social expenditure, countries’ wealth (gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita), work ethic and trade 
union density.
Relations between support for BI and 
support for the welfare state
BI is often depicted and argued for as a ‘radical 
alternative’ for the welfare state as we know it 
today. This suggests that public support for BI as a 
way of welfare provision could be radically differ-
ent from support for the welfare state, an example 
being that stronger supporters of BI are more criti-
cal about various aspects and dimensions of cur-
rent welfare states and their functioning. By 
exploring whether and in which way, support for 
BI is (radically) different from support for the tra-
ditional welfare state, we will gain more insight in 
what theories could apply to, or should be devel-
oped for understanding BI support in more detail. 
For this purpose, we will relate BI support to a 
range of commonly measured popular attitudes to 
welfare provision (Roosma et al., 2013), as regards 
its goals, the role to play for government, the pro-
vision’s redistributive design and scope, its imple-
mentation, and its (un)intended outcomes and 
consequences, and analyse whether support for BI 
aligns with these welfare attitudes or deviates 
from it. It is explicitly not our goal to explain BI 
attitudes with welfare attitudes, we rather aim to 
assess the associations between them. The ESS 
(2016) wave data allow us to operationalize atti-
tudes towards the different dimensions, and relate 
them to people’s opinion on BI. Below, we discuss 
our initial expectations about the association 
between attitudes towards the dimensions (that are 
available in the data set) and support for BI.
As for the general goals of welfare provision 
(reducing income differences and poverty) we 
assume that people who support these, are also sup-
portive of BI, since both systems of welfare provi-
sion align in them (Baker, 1992). Regarding the role 
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of government in providing welfare benefits and ser-
vices, the relationship is more ambiguous. BI is 
favoured for its simple design and providing indi-
viduals with the financial means to make their own 
choices (Widerquist et al., 2013), while social bene-
fits strongly rely on complex entitlement structures 
and conditional benefits. The state being responsible 
for providing conditional benefits might be per-
ceived as different to the provision of an uncondi-
tional income. In addition, the welfare state was 
criticized for not addressing adequately new social 
risks with the existing benefits and services (Morel 
et al., 2012). People might believe that these risks 
are better covered by a BI.
Considering the redistributive design of the 
welfare state, a central feature of it is targeting 
benefits at certain groups who are seen as deserv-
ing of support (Van Oorschot et al., 2017), while a 
BI is in essence a universal benefit provided to all 
citizens. We expect that individuals who favour 
targeting more strongly are less in favour of a BI. 
In the same line of arguing, it could be expected 
that people who fear mistargeting in terms of 
abuse of welfare provisions, or underuse of bene-
fits by people who are deserving, are more sup-
portive of a BI, since in a system of universal 
entitlement abuse and underuse of benefits would 
be non-existent.
We believe that people who are dissatisfied 
with the outcomes of the welfare state could in 
general be more likely to support BI as they might 
see it as a more fair and effective system of redis-
tribution (Widerquist et al., 2013). People who see 
the positive consequences of the welfare state in 
terms of preventing poverty and tackling inequal-
ity could see these positive outcomes as well for 
the BI (but not necessarily). On the other hand, 
people who recognize negative economic conse-
quences of the welfare state (in the sense that it 
harms the economy) would also not be very enthu-
siastic about the BI as it may have an even stronger 
redistributive impact. Also, people who believe 
that the welfare state makes people lazy will be 
even more against an unconditional BI. But peo-
ple who claim that the welfare states crowd out 
interpersonal solidarity may be more in favour of 
BI as it provides more time to combine work with 




Studying support for BI, especially in a comparative 
perspective, was long hindered by the lack of avail-
ability of high-quality survey data. Moreover, many 
questions hinting at a BI were ambiguous, for exam-
ple, asking about support for a ‘guaranteed minimum 
income’, which could be interpreted not only as sup-
port for a BI, but also as support for social assis-
tance. The ESS, round 8 (2016), measured support 
for BI – in 23 European countries3 – after providing 
respondents with an extensive introduction. The 
question is stated as follows:
A basic income scheme includes all of the following: 
the government pays everyone a monthly income to 
cover essential living costs. It replaces many other 
social benefits. The purpose is to guarantee everyone a 
minimum standard of living. Everyone receives the 
same amount regardless of whether or not they are 
working. People also keep the money they earn from 
work or other sources. This scheme is paid for by taxes. 
Overall, would you be against or in favour of having 
this scheme in [country]?
The following answer categories were provided: 
strongly in favour, in favour, against and strongly 
against. The data set contains 44,387 respondents; 
44,144 respondents answered the question about BI 
of which 3552 people choose the ‘Don’t know’ 
option (8.04%). These respondents were coded miss-
ing and robustness checks show that these ‘missings’ 
are overall random.4 In our explorative, multivariate 
analyses, we use a dummy variable indicating either 
support (1) ((strongly) in favour) or no support (0) 
((strongly) against).
As mentioned in the introduction, this is the first 
cross-sectional study that introduces the idea of BI 
with an encompassing definition of its different 
aspects: its universal and unconditional character, 
the fact that it guarantees a social minimum, that it 
replaces other benefits and services and that it is paid 
for by taxes. In debates about BI, many other 
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varieties of BI proposals are discussed, including 
proposals for a negative income tax, partial BIs, con-
ditional BIs and BI systems that replace all benefits 
and services. Unfortunately, with this survey ques-
tion, it is not possible to analyse to what elements 
people actually respond when they express their sup-
port or rejection, and we do not know how they 
interpret the different elements. At the same time, 
the question as it is formulated refers directly to the 
most common and encompassing definition of a BI 
(Widerquist et al., 2013). It can therefore function as 
a point of reference for future surveys and studies.
For our independent variables on the individual 
level, we use the following indicators. Subjective 
income is measured on a 4-point scale, indicating 
whether respondents were ‘living comfortably’ (4) 
or ‘coping’ (3) on present income or having it ‘diffi-
cult’ (2) or ‘very difficult’ with their present income. 
Work status is measured with dummy variables, 
including being in paid work (reference category), 
unemployed, in education, permanently sick or disa-
bled, retired, doing housework or community ser-
vice. Education is measured on a 5-point scale, 
running from primary education (1), to lower voca-
tional training (2), medium vocational training (3), 
higher vocational training (4) or bachelor’s and mas-
ter’s (5). Children measures whether people have 
children living with them at home. Age is measured 
in years. For gender, we use male as the reference 
category. Trade union membership indicates with 
dummy variables people who were previously or 
currently a member of a trade union or a similar orga-
nization or never have been a member (reference cate-
gory). Political affiliation is measured on an 11-point 
left–right self-placement scale (higher score indicat-
ing more right-wing). Egalitarianism is measured in 
answer to the question ‘For a fair society, differences 
in standard of living should be small’ measured on a 
5-point scale. Meritocracy is measured on a 5-point 
scale in answer to the question ‘Large differences in 
income acceptable to reward talents and efforts’.
The welfare attitudes are measured with the fol-
lowing items. Support for the goal of the welfare 
state is measured as support for the statement that 
the government should reduce income levels. The 
support for the role of the government is measured 
with three items (11-point scale), asking to what 
extent the government is responsible for providing 
childcare, a reasonable standard of living for the old 
and for the unemployed. Two other variables con-
cern support for welfare policies tackling new social 
risks: support for benefits that allow parents ‘to 
combine work and family life, even if this means 
higher taxes and support to ‘spend more on educa-
tion for unemployed at cost unemployment benefits’. 
Considering support for redistributional design, 
there is one item that measures support for targeting 
social benefits only to people with lowest incomes. 
Two variables are indicating perceived mistargeting 
of social benefits: a measure of people’s perception 
of abuse (‘many people manage to obtain benefits to 
which they are not entitled’) and a measure of per-
ceived underuse (‘many people get fewer benefits 
than they are legally entitled to’) of welfare benefits. 
People’s opinions about the outcomes of the welfare 
state are measured with eight items, asking, ‘Do 
social benefits and services lead to a more equal 
society (item 1) and less poverty (item 2)?’ ‘What do 
you think is the standard of living of the old (item 3, 
11-point scale) and of the unemployed (item 4, 
11-point scale)?; ‘Does the welfare state place a too 
great strain on the economy (item 5), and costs busi-
nesses too much in taxes and charges (item 6)?’ 
‘Does the welfare state make people lazy (item 7) or 
less willing to care for one another (item 8)?’ All 
items are measured on a 5-point scale, unless indi-
cated otherwise, and are recoded such that a higher 
score measures more support for the statement.
As contextual-level measurements, we use from 
OECD Statistics the unemployment rate as percent of 
labour force in 2015; the Gini coefficient in 2014, 
trade union density in percentages (the ratio of wage 
and salary earners that are trade union members, 
divided by the total number of wage and salary earn-
ers, calculated using administrative data adjusted for 
non-active and self-employed members otherwise 
(with some exceptions5)) in 2015 and GDP per cap-
ita in US dollars at current prices and purchasing 
power parities (PPPs) from 2015. From Eurostat, we 
use total expenditure on social protection as percent-
age of GDP in 2015 (for Poland we use data from 
2014) and material deprivation (measured as per-
centage of people who are severely materially depri-
ved, have living conditions severely constrained by a 
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lack of resources) in 2015. From the World Value 
Study, we obtain a measure for work ethic – the per-
centage of people in a country that agrees (strongly) 
that it is humiliating to receive money without having 
to work for it – for 2008. For Israel, data are missing 
on social expenditure, material deprivation and work 
ethic. For Russia, data are missing on social expendi-
ture, material deprivation and union density.
Methods
We first present several descriptive statistics (design 
and population weights are applied) and then, sec-
ond, continue with our multivariate analyses pre-
senting several multilevel logistic regression models 
in which we add three sets of individual-level indica-
tors step by step (including first the socio-economic 
characteristics, then the ideological characteristics 
(including trade union membership) and finally, the 
welfare attitudes). In the third step, we include the 
contextual-level measures. Because of a limited 
number of level 2 units (countries), we only include 
one variable in Models 4–10 and two contextual 
variables in Model 11. For measuring the explained 
variance, we follow instructions from Snijders and 
Bosker (2012: 305–307). We compute the linear 
predictor for Ŷij and use its observed variance. This 
variance is divided by the total variance, which con-
sists of the variance of the linear predictor, the vari-
ance of the random intercept and the fixed value of 
the level-one residual variance (π2/3).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 presents an overview of support for BI in 
the different countries. We see ample variation in 
support for BI with the highest level of support in 
Latvia (over 80% indicates to be (strongly) in favour 
of a BI) and the lowest level of support in Norway 
(over 66% indicates to be (strongly) against a BI). 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that support for such a 
radical alternative to the current welfare system 
gains so much support in European countries. In 
total, about 56 percent of the respondents in this 
selection of countries indicates support, while 
44 percent is against a BI. In 20 out of 23 countries, 
support is higher than 45 percent. Overall, it seems 
that populations in Eastern European countries are 
more in favour than their counterparts in Nordic and 
Western European countries, although there are 
Figure 1. Support for BI in European countries – 2016.
ESS (2016), design weights are applied.
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some exceptions (for instance, Estonia being more 
against BI and Finland more in favour compared 
with their respective region).
Effects of individual-level indicators
In the next step, we relate support for BI to three sets 
of individual-level variables. The results are pre-
sented in Table 1. Model 0 is the empty model. The 
intra-class correlation (ICC) for this empty model is 
small: 0.067, which means that only a small propor-
tion of about 7 percent of the differences between 
individuals is related to the group level (countries) 
(which suggests that the influence of country charac-
teristics may be small). In Model 1, we include all 
variables that measure people’s social position. The 
results show that there is a relatively strong and posi-
tive relation with having a lower subjective income 
and being unemployed, on the one hand, and sup-
porting a BI, on the other. This confirms previous 
results (Andersson and Kangas, 2002; Stadelmann-
Steffen and Dermont, 2017) and may be an indica-
tion that people primarily see BI as a way to secure 
themselves of a guaranteed income. Higher educated 
people, people having children at home and elderly 
people are less in favour of a BI. As BI is often 
depicted in the literature as a way to make it easier to 
combine work and family life, it is remarkable that 
having children has a small but negative relation 
with BI support. Interestingly, the effect of age 
shows that younger people are more in favour of this 
‘radical alternative’ to the current welfare state. This 
might be because younger people – or people from 
younger cohorts – see BI as an opportunity to invest 
in personal development, or are more open to new 
ideas, or see advantages of a new system of welfare 
support that addresses new social risks better. There 
is no significant effect of gender, despite arguments 
that females would benefit relatively more from a BI 
as they would gain in economic independence.
In Model 2, we add the individual-level items that 
measure ideological and political position, and trade 
union membership. It shows that despite of some 
advocates among philosophers and politicians from 
the political right under the general public, BI is 
mostly carried by the political left. Current or previ-
ous trade union membership has no significant 
relationship with BI support. Only when we control 
for all welfare attitudes in Model 3, the negative 
effect of current trade union membership becomes 
borderline significant. The critical position of the 
trade unions against BI does not seem to largely 
affect those who are or were members of it.
The level of explained variance in these first two 
models is fairly low. Yet, it must be noted that the 
R2-value is considerably lower for logistic regres-
sion than for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
with continuous outcomes (Snijders and Bosker, 
2012: 306).
In Model 3, we add the variables that measure 
various dimensions of welfare support. The 
explained variance almost triples to 0.11. The rela-
tions with welfare attitudes provide interesting 
insights in possible reasons for BI support. We see a 
strong positive relation between support for BI and 
support for the goal to reduce income differences. 
Support for the role of government (range) is, as 
expected, not automatically related to support for a 
BI. The effects are relatively small and there is even 
a negative relation with those who support the gov-
ernment to be responsible for childcare. This could 
be because supporters of a BI would rather have 
more time (and financial means) to take care of their 
children, instead of relying on state/organized child-
care. Interestingly, the relations with support for 
social investment type of roles of the government 
(investing in education of unemployed and benefits 
to combine work–family life) are very strong: people 
who are more in favour of such social investment 
arrangements are also more in favour of a BI. This 
could suggest that by some BI is indeed perceived as 
a modern, innovative idea as an alternative for the 
current welfare state.
Surprisingly, there is a strong positive relation 
between support for targeting benefits to the poor 
only and BI support. As targeting benefits exclu-
sively to the poor is directly opposing the universal 
character of the BI, this result raises questions about 
whether respondents have really understood what a 
BI actually entails: do people really understand that 
‘everyone receives the same amount’, means includ-
ing the middle classes and the rich as well? Or, can 
this result be interpreted that people support a BI and 
targeting benefits only at the poor, for the same 
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Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression models on support for BI – contextual factors controlled for all individual-
level items.









Model 4 Unemployment rate 0.004 0.025 0.205 0.448 0.114 27,618 23
Model 5 Material deprivation 0.070*** 0.016 0.104 0.584 0.147 25,398 21
Model 6 Gini coefficient 2.361 2.398 0.198 0.471 0.119 27,618 23
Model 7 Social expenditure –0.036** 0.017 0.174 0.499 0.126 25,398 21
Model 8 Work ethic 0.013 0.012 0.203 0.471 0.119 26,117 22
Model 9 Union density –0.006 0.004 0.185 0.465 0.118 26,845 22
Model 10 GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.453 0.115 27,618 23
Model 11 Material deprivation 0.065*** 0.018 0.104 0.584 0.147 25,398 21
Social expenditure –0.010 0.149
GDP: gross domestic product; SE: standard error.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
reason: improving the conditions of the poor. Whether 
this is by introducing a BI or by targeting benefits 
only to the poor might be irrelevant to them.
This interpretation of the results would also explain 
the relations between BI support and perceived abuse 
and underuse of benefits. Abuse of welfare would be 
more or less solved when a BI is introduced. Because 
every citizen is entitled, abusing benefits would be 
impossible. Yet, the results show that people who see 
a lot of welfare abuse are more against introducing a 
BI. This may result from the fear that benefits are tar-
geted at people who do not really need them or abuse 
these benefits (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). 
People who see a lot of underuse of benefits are 
instead very supportive of a BI. This could suggest 
that those who are worried that people who are deserv-
ing of benefits do not get assistance are more likely to 
support a BI that provides a guaranteed minimum 
income for everyone, including those who now are 
not receiving what they are entitled to. This may add 
to an overall interpretation that a BI is supported for 
its ability to provide a guaranteed minimum and 
address issues of poverty rather than to overcome the 
major flaws of our current welfare system.
Inspecting the relationships with the items repre-
senting the perceived outcome of the welfare state 
would lead to a similar interpretation. People who are 
very critical about the outcomes of the welfare state 
are not more in favour of the alternative BI. Relations 
are small and insignificant instead. Only those who 
believe that welfare benefits will reduce equality and 
poverty are more in favour of a BI. This also seems to 
suggest that a BI is seen as an alternative way to 
address the needs of the poor. The fact that people 
who believe that the welfare state makes people lazy 
are more against a BI shows one of the major pitfalls 
of social legitimacy of BI: the unconditional aspect of 
BI goes against the fundamental deservingness crite-
rion of reciprocity (Van Oorschot et al., 2017).
Contextual effects on BI support
In Table 2, we present Models 4–11 in which contex-
tual-level factors are added, one in each model. Most 
indicators are not significant and the explained vari-
ance does not increase much compared with Model 3 
with all individual-level variables included. Only 
two indicators have a significant effect. The degree 
of material deprivation in a country significantly 
influences support for BI positively (Model 5). Such 
deprivation seems to the most important contextual 
factor, since in this model, the explained variance 
increases substantially to 0.146. Also, the level of 
social spending has a significant effect (Model 10). 
The higher the social spending in a country, the 
lower support for BI. In generous welfare states, 
there seems less reason to support an alternative 
social model. However, this effect adds not so much 
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in additional explanatory value. If material depriva-
tion and social spending are both included (in Model 
11), the effect of material deprivation remains sig-
nificant, while the effect of social spending turns 
insignificant instead and the increase in explained 
variance compared with Model 5 is only marginal.
Discussion and conclusion
In the past years, advocates of an unconditional uni-
versal BI have entered the public debate and tried to 
influence the political and social policy agenda by 
proposing a radical alternative to our current welfare 
state. As we know that European welfare states are 
both supported for their goals and policies, as well as 
criticized for their mistargeting and outcomes 
(Roosma et al., 2013), it is not only interesting to 
study to what extent the general public supports a BI, 
but also if they see a BI as a possible alternative for 
the welfare state or flaws of it.
A first conclusion of our article is that support for 
BI is high across Europe. Considering the fact that 
the proposal would have major consequences for our 
current welfare systems, both in redistributional 
effects, as in social and economic outcomes and in 
terms of (administrative) implementation, support 
for BI seems to be rather overwhelming. In 20 out of 
23 countries, support is higher than 45 percent. The 
high support confirms results from previous studies 
(Dalia, 2017; Ipsos, 2017), but in the ESS question, 
for the first time, BI was explained and introduced to 
the respondents by providing an elaborate definition. 
Not only the universal and unconditional character 
were highlighted, but also the fact that the scheme 
would be paid for by taxes.
This overwhelming support might therefore raise 
some doubts whether respondents fully understand 
the impact of introducing a BI. Or, more likely, it 
may be that they express support for different rea-
sons. A BI is a complex proposal with many aspects 
of which some could be praised by respondents, 
while others could be criticized. Although we could 
not test the motivations of people to express support 
(or disagreement) with BI, the individual respondent 
characteristics that affect BI support, the relation-
ships between BI support and attitudes towards vari-
ous welfare state dimensions, and the effects of 
contextual-level factors on BI support give us some 
indications that point in a similar direction. That is, 
people in a worse social–economic position, people 
supporting egalitarian values and people leaning to 
the political left are more in favour of a BI. Also, 
people who want the government to reduce income 
levels and people who support targeting benefits at 
the poor (!) are more in favour of a BI. In countries 
where material deprivation is high, support for BI is 
significantly stronger. This all may suggest that peo-
ple in general express support for the BI proposal for 
the reason that they want to improve the conditions 
of the people who are worse off in their country 
(which may include themselves). If this would be the 
case, then it is not the universal character or its 
unconditionality that makes a BI so attractive to a 
large share of the European population, but the fact 
that it provides (poor) people with a guaranteed min-
imum income. It could also implicate that a BI is not 
a politically neutral idea. That is, academic or social 
supporters of the BI may have different political and 
philosophical affiliations, among the general public, 
the idea of BI is carried mostly by the political left. 
This would of course require further study and the 
development of a theoretical framework that distin-
guishes different mechanisms for explaining support 
for different elements of BI. We suggest that deserv-
ingness theory would provide a relevant starting 
point to formulate expectations regarding support 
for specific elements as the universal and uncondi-
tional character of BI, as particularly these aspects 
violate the popular deservingness criteria of need, 
reciprocity and control (Van Oorschot et al., 2017).
Critique on the current welfare state, regarding its 
mistargeting of benefits or negative economic, moral 
and social consequences, is no reason to support a 
radical alternative. In fact, people who expect abuse 
of welfare benefits or moral hazard are more likely 
to reject a BI. It suggests that a BI might deal with 
the same legitimacy issues as the welfare state: a fear 
for inactiveness and freeriding.
An interesting part of the results is the strong 
positive relation with support for social investment 
policies (in educating the unemployed and in com-
bining work–family life). People who are open to 
such welfare reforms might also be more open 
towards reform by means of a BI. Also, the fact that 
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younger people – or this might be people from 
younger cohorts – are more supportive of a BI might 
give some hope to BI advocates who present the 
proposal a social system of the future.
The major drawback of our study is that our inter-
pretations could only be based on modest quantita-
tive relations between survey items of a large pooled 
sample of Europeans. The question whether or not 
the proposal of BI has social legitimacy is therefore 
not definitely answered. We need more (especially 
qualitative) studies to ask people about their particu-
lar understandings of BI, which elements of the idea 
they support and reject, and their argumentations to 
be in favour or against it. This will not only tell us 
more about whether or not the introduction of BI can 
be successful in the future, but also – if the BI pro-
posal remains a futuristic idea only – what elements 
of our current welfare system need improvement 
according to the public.
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Notes
1. In Eurobarometer and International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) surveys, questions have been 
included that measure support for what is called ‘a guar-
anteed basic income’. One can question whether these 
measures rather support for a ‘floor for the poor’ (Liebig 
and Mau, 2002), a fundamentally different social provi-
sion like means-tested social assistance or a minimum 
income guarantee. Scholars studying this question opt 
for this interpretation rather interpreting it as basic 
income (BI) support (Pfeifer, 2009; Ullrich, 2002).
2. Labour unions and feminist movements are in general 
not in favour of BI. Labour unions tend to see a BI as 
a threat for their labour relations-based power, and 
feminists point to its possible ‘kitchen’ effect, when 
the BI would reduce labour market participation of 
especially women (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 
2017; Widerquist et al., 2013).
3. Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), 
Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), 
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain 
(GB), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Iceland 
(IS), Italy (IT), Latvia (LT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russia 
(RU), Sweden (SE) and Slovenia (SI).
4. There is some cross-national variation showing that 
missing values are especially high in Poland, Latvia 
and Russia. Regression models, for each country sep-
arately, including all our individual-level variables 
show that these missing values are overall random. 
We do find that in seven countries (BE, ES, FI, FR, 
GB, LT and PL), people with a lower education are 
more likely opt for the ‘don’t know’ option, while in 
Russia, higher educated are more likely to answer 
‘don’t know’.
5. Exceptions: Estonia survey data 2015; Iceland survey 
data 2015; Ireland survey data 2015; Israel adminis-
trative data 2012; Poland administrative data 2014.
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